Introduction
The Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 (Cth) (PBR Act) and the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (Patents Act) establish statutory schemes that grant exclusivity to certain dealings with biological organisms.
1 Both schemes, however, include and exclude certain kinds of biological organisms, using terminology that is poorly crafted so that the interface between what is included, and what is excluded, remains uncertain. 2 The concern of this article is that the terminology of inclusion and exclusion used in both the PBR Act and the Patents Act fails to meaningfully conceptualise what biological organisms are suitable subject-matter for these statutory privileges. The pressure points of particular concern addressed in this article are the meanings of the terms 'plant' (including 'fungi' and 'algae') for 'plant breeder's rights' (PBR) under the PBR Act and 'plants' and 'animals' for an 'innovation patent' under the Patents Act. While this might appear to be a minor technicality, its consequences are significant as the scope of the PBR Act and the scope of some exclusions under the Patents Act are determined by the meanings of these terms. Thus the purpose of the article is to examine whether the imprints of taxonomy (the classification of organisms) 3 and the related nomenclature (the naming codes) echoed in the PBR Act and the Patents Act provide a useful means of conceptualising biological organisms. In other words, this analysis considers the passive use of conventions practised in other disciplines (epistemic cultures) to define the objects of law, thereby becoming a part of the scaffolding of law themselves. In this case, it is the interaction between taxonomy and naming codes, and their contribution to defining the legal object for market exclusivity under the economic instruments defined by PBR Act and the Patents Act. The analysis also illustrates the extra-legal interpretation of the content of law as many of the basic concepts in PBR and patent law remain to be adjudicated by courts, and so the existing practice of IP Australia in its interpretation and implementation determine the content and meanings of key terms. This accepts and acknowledges, of course, that only a court can finally decide the matter.
The article is structured as follows: the next two sections map the statutory schemes in the PBR Act and the Patents Act, addressing biological organisms; the following two sections consider the likely application of taxonomy and the related naming codes to biological organisms that might be defined as 'plants' (including 'fungi' and 'algae') and 'animals' in the context of the PBR Act and the Patents Act, demonstrating the instability in taxonomy and the arbitrariness of naming codes as consistent determinants of definition; and the article concludes that taxonomy and the related naming codes do assist in usefully conceptualising 'plants', 'animals', 'fungi' and 'algae' under the PBR Act and the Patents Act, although final and absolute certainty is unlikely, with the consequence that taxonomy and the related naming codes are a useful proxy for reducing organisms to the objects of law.
bacteriophages '. 22 And the term 'hybrid' means 'a plant that is a combination of 2 or more genotypes of the same or different taxa but excluding a combination comprising a scion grafted on to a root stock '. 23 Thus the subject-matter of a PBR is a 'plant variety '. 24 This comprises a 'plant grouping' that itself consists of 'plants', 'fungi' and 'algae', but not 'bacteria ', 'bacteroids', 'mycoplasmas', 'viruses', 'viroids' and 'bacteriophages' . 25 The effect of these various definitions is that, for the purposes of the PBR Act, the scope of subject-matter includes 'plants', 'fungi' and 'algae', albeit there is no comprehensive definition of exactly what constitutes a 'plant', a 'fungus' or an 'alga'. A common thread among the various definition provisions is the reference to taxonomic language: something 'contained within a single botanical taxon of the lowest known rank '; 26 'a plant that is a combination of 2 or more genotypes of the same or different taxa '; 27 and 'treated as constituting a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon ' (emphasis added) . 28 This suggests that taxonomy may be involved in conceiving what a 'plant variety' is for the purposes of PBR.
Some further interpretive assistance might be found in the provisions of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) that the PBR Act implements in Australia, providing that 'the grant [of a PBR] is appropriate to give effect to the obligations of Australia under the [UPOV]'. 29 The UPOV requires contracting parties such as Australia to 'grant and protect breeders' rights' to 'all plant genera and species'. 30 The UPOV defines the term 'variety' using taxonomic language: 'a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest known rank' (emphasis added).
31
Another requirement under the PBR Act is that an application must set out both 'the name of the variety' and 'any proposed synonym for that name '. 32 Further, the 'name (including a synonym), in respect of a plant variety must comply with the International Code of Botanical Nomenclature and subsidiary codes'. 33 For the purposes of this naming according to the International Code of Botanical Nomenclature, the term 'plant' means 'any 22 Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 (Cth), s 3(1) ('plant').
23
Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 (Cth), s 3(1) ('hybrid'). 24 See Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 (Cth), s 11. 25 See Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 (Cth), s 3(1) ('plant' and 'plant variety') . 26 Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 (Cth), s 3(1)(a) ('plant variety') . Notably the definition of 'hybrid' also makes reference to 'taxa': s 3(1)(a) ('hybrid') 27 Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 (Cth), s 3(1) ('hybrid'). 
32
Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 (Cth), ss 3(1) ('synonym') and 26(2)(f).
33
Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 (Cth), s 27(6). organism traditionally studied by botanists' 34 and applies to 'all organisms traditionally treated as plants '. 35 Significantly, these rules are applied according to the principle that '[b] otanical nomenclature is independent of zoological and bacteriological nomenclature' and 'applies equally to names of taxonomic groups treated as plants whether or not these groups were originally so treated' (emphasis added).
36
The International Code of Botanical Nomenclature 37 and subsidiary codes (such as the International Code of Nomenclature for Cultivated Plants, addressing a 'precise, stable, and simple system of naming [agricultural, forestry, and horticultural] plants that can be applied internationally') 38 provide a comprehensive set of rules for naming botanical organisms, including algae, blue-green algae, various fungi such as chytrids, oomycetes and slime moulds, various photosynthetic protists and some of the taxonomically related non-photosynthetic groups (and some fossils). 39 Significantly, the International Code of Botanical Nomenclature and subsidiary codes (such as International Code of Nomenclature for Cultivated Plants) 40 generally apply naming rules based on taxonomic groupings: 'The purpose of giving a name to a taxonomic group is not to indicate its characters or history, but to supply a means of referring to it and to indicate its taxonomic rank.' (emphasis added) 41 Another naming requirement under the PBR Act is that a 'name (including a synonym), in respect of a plant variety must not … be likely to deceive or cause confusion, including confusion with the name of another plant variety of the same plant class'. 42 The term 'plant class' consists of plants that 'belong to a single botanical genus' or 'belong to a group of closely related genera' and that are on the Registrar's List of Plant Classes (emphasis added). 43 The Registrar's 'List of Plant Classes' then provides a 'General Rule' that 'for genera and species not covered by the List of Classes in this Annex, a genus is considered to be a class', and then 'Exceptions to the General Rule' that are 'Classes within a genus ' and 34 International Code of Botanical Nomenclature, Preamble 1 (and footnote) and Appendix 7 ('plant'). 'Classes encompassing more than one genus'. 44 The effect of this naming scheme is to limit the term 'plant' in the PBR Act to only those organisms capable of being named according to the 'List of Plant Classes' that is itself dependant on the International Code of Botanical Nomenclature and subsidiary codes (and particularly the International Code of Nomenclature for Cultivated Plants) that generally assign names according to taxonomy.
This analysis demonstrates that to be the subject-matter of protection under the PBR Act a 'plant variety' is conceived in the language and application of taxonomy and naming codes. The meaning of 'plant' under the PBR Act in the context of taxonomy and these naming codes is considered further below after an analysis of the relevant parts of the Patents Act.
The Patents Act 1990 (Cth)
The Patents Act grants the 'exclusive rights' to a 'patentee' 45 of a 'standard patent' 46 (for up to 20 or 25 years), 47 or an 'innovation patent' 48 (for up to eight years), 49 to 'exploit 50 the invention and to authorize another person to exploit the invention'.
51 To obtain a 'standard patent' or an 'innovation patent', the applicant 52 must lodge an application, 53 and eventually lodge a 'complete specification' 54 that describes and defines the boundaries of the invention.
55 A 'patent' may then be granted for a 'patentable invention' 56 that is an 'invention' 57 that satisfies various threshold standards including that it be subject-matter suitable for patenting ('a manner of manufacture').
58 Thus the subject-matter of a 'patent' is an 'invention'. Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 3 and Sch 1 ('patentee').
46
Patents Act 1990 (Cth), ss 3 and Sch 1 ('standard patent') and 61.
47
Patents Act 1990 (Cth), ss 67 (20 years) and 77 (extension up to 25 years for some subject-matters).
48
Patents Act 1990 (Cth), ss 3 and Sch 1 ('innovation patent') and 62.
49
Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 68.
50
Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 3 and Sch 1 ('exploit').
51
Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 13(1).
52
This can include more than one applicant: see Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 31. 53 See Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 29. Notably, there is a domestic and international scheme for applications: see IP Australia (2010a) Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 3 and Sch 1 ('complete specification').
55
Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 40(2).
56
Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 3 and Sch 1 ('patentable invention').
57
Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 3 and Sch 1 ('invention'). Pila (2003) . Notably, under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth), the term 'manner of manufacture' was intended to 'mean little more than that an invention must belong to the useful arts rather than the fine arts', and so adopted a 'flexible threshold test of patentability … in preference to adopting a more inflexible codified definition': Explanatory Memorandum (1989), p 8. See also Industrial Property Advisory Council (1984) , p 40.
62
The decision establishes the oft-cited standard: 'The right question is, "Is this a proper subject of letters patent according to the principles which have been developed for the application of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies?" ' National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 at 269 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ). Exactly what these principles are remains contentious -for example, see Hubicki and Sherman (2009), pp 73-96; Monotti (2006) .
63
For an overview of these subject-matters: see IP Australia (2010a) Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479 at 502-3 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ).
Application
. 66 There IP Australia (then the Australian Patent Office) granted a patent claim for a pure cultured bacterium on the basis that an inventive step had been applied to purifying the naturally occurring organism by 'producing the variant by some man-controlled microbiological process'.
67
The claim for the isolated strain of the naturally occurring bacterium was refused, 68 but claims were accepted for those bacteria demonstrating some intervention. 69 The principle applied to living organisms appears to be that potentially any change from a 'natural' state may be patentable (an 'invention'), while in the 'natural' state it will be unpatentable (a 'discovery'). 70 The distinction between 'invention' and 'discovery' should now be abandoned as '[t] he truth is that the distinction between discovery and invention is not precise enough to be other than misleading ', 71 and in its place the relevant inquiry is whether the claimed subject-matter is 'an artificially created state of affairs' with some new and useful effect. 72 The current IP Australia practice is that 'the isolation and cultivation of naturally occurring micro-organisms satisfy the requirement of a technical intervention' (emphasis added Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 at 264 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ). This issue is that in 'nature' the organism (or gene, protein, fragment, molecule, and so on) is discovered, while outside that 'nature' the same organism (or gene, protein, fragment, molecule, and so on) with the same now useful function becomes inventive: see Lawson (2004) , pp 98-99. Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 at 277 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ). In effect, the High Court abandoned one framing of a metaphysical question (discovery/invention) for another (not artificial/artificial) and returned to a conception of invention as a process of making by art or skill: see Hubicki and Sherman (2009) 's Application (1976) 46 AOJP 3915 at 3968 refers to 'some man controlled microbiological process' resulting in 'improved or altered useful properties' so that the IP Australia requirement for 'a technical intervention' must also be 'man controlled' and an 'improvement' which is more than mere 'intervention'.
72

National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of
74
IP Australia (2010a), [2.9.2.14].
components. 75 The only clear statutory exceptions relating to 'plants ' and 'animals' are: 76 the exclusion from 'standard patents' and 'innovation patents' of '[h]uman beings, and the biological processes for their generation'; 77 and the exclusion from 'innovation patents' of 'plants and animals' and 'the biological processes for the generation of plants and animals'.
78 While 'human beings' might be within the meaning of the term 'animals' for the purposes of the Patents Act, this seems unlikely as a dictionary definition of 'animal' includes 'any animal other than a human' (emphasis added), 79 and the 'human beings' exception has been applied separately as a test of what constitutes 'essentially human characteristics' (that is not defeated by any technological means of how the 'human being' is constituted or created). 80 The exclusion from 'innovation patents' of 'plants and animals' and 'the biological processes for the generation of plants and animals' are considered now.
Following an application for an 'innovation patent', the Commissioner of Patents (in IP Australia) must accept the 'patent request' 81 and 'complete specification' 82 following a 'formalities check'. Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 3 and Sch 1 ('patent request').
82
Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 3 and Sch 1 ('complete specification'). 83 See Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 3 and Sch 1 ('formalities check') and ss 52 (1) and (2); Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth), r 3.2B.
Commissioner assesses the complete specification, 84 assessing the various threshold criteria on examination 85 and re-examination. 86 The Commissioner and others can seek the revocation of a granted innovation patent either by the Commissioner 87 or in proceedings, 88 including as a cross-claim to infringement. 89 A part of the assessment at examination, opposition and revocation is whether the alleged invention is appropriate subject-matter.
90
In addition to the 'manner of manufacture' threshold, 91 the Patents Act expressly excludes 'plants and animals, and the biological processes for the generation of plants and animals' unless they are 'a microbiological process or a product of such a process'. 92 The meaning of the terms 'plants' and 'animals' in this provision remains uncertain. The extrinsic materials, remaining debate in Parliament and the associated extrinsic materials provided no further clues to what the terms 'plant' and 'animal' might mean. 93 The section 18(3) exclusion has, however, been interpreted by IP Australia as having some relationship to the term 'plant' in the PBR Act so as avoid an overlap between PBRs and innovation patents. 94 The result has been to allow the innovation patenting of microorganisms 95 and 84 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), ss 101A and 101B(1) ('examination'), 101G ('re-examination') and 101N(3) 'opposition').
85
Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 101B(1) ('examination').
86
Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 101G(2) ('re-examination').
87
Patents Act 1990 (Cth), ss 101F (after 'examination'), 101J (after 're-examination') and 101N ('opposition').
88
Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 138 ('revocation in circumstances other than surrender'). Notably the patent holder can also seek revocation on surrender of the patent: s 137 ('revocation on surrender').
89
Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 121(1) ('cross-claim to infringement'). 90 See Patents Act 1990 (Cth), ss 101B(2)(b) ('examination'), 101M(b) ('opposition') and s 138(3)(b) ('revocation in other circumstances'). Notably, 're-examination' is confined to the thresholds of 'novel' and 'innovative step': s 101G(3). while excluding 'animals' and 'plants' (embracing 'all fungi (including yeasts and moulds) and algae') 97 such as: 'genetically modified whole plants, plants produced by cross-breeding of one strain with another strain, or selection of a plant from a range of plants'; 'genetically modified whole animals (including human beings), animals produced by cross-breeding of one strain with another strain, or selection of an animal from a range of animals'; 'seeds of plants, plant tissue cultures, or any matter that could give rise to a plant'; and 'animal embryos or fetuses, zygote, or any matter or group of cells, that could give rise to an animal'.
98
A further requirement of the Patents Act is to describe an invention fully 99 so that the nature of the invention is apparent from reading the whole otherwise be considered 'plants' and 'animals' (and within the Kingdoms Animalia and Plantae) are also small in size (in fact, microscopic), perhaps introducing a size standard for the terms 'plant' and 'animal'. For example, a photosynthesising blue-green algae could be characterised as a 'plant' because of its photosynthesising capacity while also being characterised as a 'Monera' and 'micro-organism' outside the meaning of 'plant' (as in 'Planta'): see Whittaker (1969) Such as 'preparation of cheese, wine making, brewing and industrial processes involving the use of microorganism such as microbial bleaching, leaching of ores using microorganism', 'the use of enzymes derived from microorganisms for the preparation of, for example cheese or, detergents comprising protease', 'the use of yeast, fungi or moulds for the production of useful products, for example penicillin, enzymes, fermented meats, or industrial alcohol and the products produced by such use' and 'the use of viruses in the preparation of vaccines, for example': IP Australia (2010a) The naming standards relevant to a person skilled in the art are those set out in the various naming codes such as the International Code of Botanical Nomenclature, the International Code of Nomenclature for Cultivated Plants, and so on. In short, this analysis shows that, like the PBR Act -although perhaps not so boldly -biological organisms under the Patents Act are also conceived in the language and application of taxonomy and naming codes. The next issues are whether taxonomy and the naming codes are suitable means of conceiving biological organisms for the purposes of the PBR Act and the Patents Act.
grouping of organisms according to characteristics, which is the essence of taxonomy, and this is consistent with the taxonomic language used in both the PBR Act and the Patents Act. The issue for our purposes is whether taxonomy can usefully distinguish and bound 'algae', 'animals', 'fungi' and 'plants'.
Modern taxonomy traces its origins to concerns that biological organisms should be identified distinctly by a name so that a decontextualised identifier of a specific kind of organism would allow global exchange.
107
The approach was to classify organisms according to similarities following a strict hierarchy based on increasingly shared characters, and characters that distinguish between sub-groupings ('boxes within boxes').
108
Over time, the classification of the variation and complexity of biological organisms has evolved to a consensus model that recognises a hierarchy of relationships -a hierarchy from gross similarity to the minutia of difference: Domain, Kingdom, Divisions (Phylum), Classes, Orders, Families, Genera, Species, and then a plethora of lower rank taxa (including sub-species, varieties, forms, cultivars, and so on).
109 A unifying theme has been the evolutionary idea of organisms having a (single) common ancestry (the 'Tree of Life'), with the apparent diversity reflecting adaptive mechanisms first detailed by Darwin and subsequently synthesised to deal with genetics (the New Synthesis or neo-Darwinism). See, for an elegant synthesis, Gould (2002) . Comparative and functional genomics is, however, challenging this evolutionary conception of organism relationships according to the 'Tree of Life' -see, for example, Koonin (2009); Lynch (2007) .
111 Nicolson (1991) The most widely accepted scheme of classification above the rank of Genera recognises five kingdoms (Animalia, Plantae, Fungi, Protista and Monera).
114 Within this scheme, the groupings of 'animals', 'plants' (not including 'fungi' and 'algae') and 'fungi' appear to correspond neatly with the kingdoms Animalia, Plantae and Fungi respectively. 115 There remain, however, further proposals for even more groupings at the kingdom taxon showing that taxonomy itself remains contested.
116 The six-kingdom scheme (Animalia, Plantae, Fungi, Protozoa, Chromista and Bacteria) also appears to correspond neatly with the kingdoms Animalia, Plantae and Fungi for the groupings of 'animals', 'plants' (not including 'fungi' and 'algae') and 'fungi' respectively, although the respective contents of the six kingdoms do not correspond with the content of the earlier five kingdoms. 117 This suggests that limiting the meaning of the terms according to the organisms within the kingdom taxon (and according to the five-or six-kingdom classification) may usefully distinguish the biological organisms defined as 'plants' (not including 'fungi' and 'algae') and 'fungi' that are included within the subject-matter of the PBR Act, and 'animals' and 'plants' excluded from an 'innovation patent' under the Patents Act. 118 The immediate problem would be that a particular organism might fall within a different kingdom, depending on the choice of the five-or six-kingdom scheme.
119
The more acute problem arises, however, for 'algae' that are classified in different kingdoms (according to the five-kingdom classification), Bacteria, Rule 27(2); International Code of Virus Classification and Nomenclature, Rule 5.
113
Perhaps importantly, a 'taxon' is an artificial designation of degrees of similarity ('boxes within boxes') adopted by taxonomists, and there is no equivalence between a taxon applied to distinguishable taxa at that level. In other words, the taxa applied to domestic cats (Felis catus L) bear no resemblance to the degrees of similarity of taxa applied to mangoes (Mangifera indica L). See also de Queiroz and Cantino (2001) . 114 See Whittaker (1969) . Notably, Monera might be split into the Eubacteria and the Archaebacteria in a six-kingdom classification: see . There might be a growing consensus for groupings within the five-kingdom classification (Animalia, Plantae, Fungi and Protista) to accord with a system of six 'supergroups' (Amoebozoa, Chromalveolata, Excavata, Opisthokonta, Plantae and Rhizaria) -see, for example, Wegener Parfrey et al (2006) . 115 See Whittaker (1969) , pp 154-55 and 157. 116 See, for example, Cavalier-Smith (1981 , 1998 ; see also Mayr (1990); Corliss (1984) . 117 See Cavalier-Smith (1998) . 118 See Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 (Cth), s 3(1); Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 18(3).
119
For example, the six-kingdoms classification includes brown algae in Kingdom Chromista (see Cavalier-Smith 1998, p 250) while the five-kingdom classification includes brown algae in Kingdom Plantae (Whittaker 1969, p 154) . So, depending on the choice of classification, brown algae might be classified as 'plants' in Kingdom Plantae. depending on the particular characters: blue-green algae in Monera; golden algae in Protista; red, green and brown algae in Plantae. 120 Further, the dictionary reference for 'algae' to 'chlorophyll-containing plants belonging to the phylum Thallophyta', set out above, adds further confusion as the term 'Thallophyta' is not defined in the dictionary, and probably refers to a defunct taxon comprising a heterogeneous assemblage of flowerless and seedless organisms including algae, bacteria, fungi and lichens. Thus, taxonomy according to the kingdom taxon does not usefully distinguish the biological organisms defined as 'algae' that are included within the subjectmatter of the PBR Act (and possibly excluded from an 'innovation patent' under the Patents Act). 121 The term 'algae' may, however, be usefully distinguished according to the five-kingdom classification at the division (or phylum) taxon: blue-green algae in Phylum Cyanophyta (in Kingdom Monera); golden algae in Phylum Chrysophyta (in Kingdom Protista); red, brown and green algae in Phylum Rhodophyta, Phaeophyta and Chlorophyta (in Kingdom Plantae).
122
Similarly, according to the six-kingdom classification, 'algae' may usefully be distinguished at the division (or phylum) taxon: blue-green algae in Phylum Cyanobacteria (in Kingdom Bacteria); golden algae and brown algae in Phylum Ochrophyta (in Kingdom Chromista); red and green algae in Phylum Rhodophyta and Chlorophyta respectively (in Kingdom Plantae).
123
While the five-and six-kingdom classifications remain popular, they remain contested, especially with the development of modern genetics and molecular biology. As a consequence of the considerable diversity of organisms that have evolved over a very long timespan, any classification scheme naming groupings will impose arbitrary distinctions on the continuum of natural variation. There are two predominant metaclassification methodologies that have developed. One focuses on grouping organisms according to all anatomical and bio-molecular similarities (the 'traditional' or pre-Darwin Linnaean system of taxonomy now accommodating the principle of common descent) (the five-and sixkingdom classifications); the other focuses on grouping organisms according to some anatomical and bio-molecular similarities of relatedness (also called phylogenetics -the post-Darwin system based on the principle of common descent). 124 The difference in these meta-methodologies is essentially about 120 See, for example, Whittaker (1969) the weight given to the anatomical and bio-molecular characters, the latter phylogenetics giving greater weight to shared derived (synapormophy) characters (and excluding primitive features or plesiomorphy), and based on the principle of common descent (evolution) as opposed to mere shared characters. 125 The consequence for taxonomy is that groupings based on the 'traditional' or pre-Darwin Linnaean system of taxonomy mandate that organisms be assigned to the kingdom, division/phylum, order, family, genus taxa, implying relatedness that may not actually exist. 126 The result of then adopting refinements on the basis of phylogenetics within the traditional taxonomy has been an ongoing development of uncertain classifications ('taxon stability' and the quest for mono-phylogeny).
127 This uncertainty is a direct consequence of the recent developments in comparative and functional genomics that now challenge the neat (evolutionary) conception of organismal relationships according to common ancestry and the 'Tree of Life', and demonstrate that non-adaptive processes are significant.
128 Importantly, while these developments do not challenge the proposition that extant life evolved from a single common ancestor, they do make tracing the particular steps of evolution and differentiation extraordinarily difficult, 129 and open the likely taxonomy for the two predominant meta-classification methodologies, and the merging of information resulting from these methodologies, to considerable differences and controversies. 130 The result has been in recent decades a proliferation of taxonomies: three domains; 131 five kingdoms; 132 six kingdoms; 133 six supergroups, 134 and so on. 135 While the five-kingdom classification appears to (pre-Darwin Linnaean) system considers all similarities as meaningful, while phylogenetics (post-Darwin) only takes account of some similarities associated with relatedness (shared derived characters or synapomorphies) and expressly excludes retained primitive characteristics (or plesiomorphy).
125
This is an ongoing controversy, especially with determining primitive versus derived character states and the weight to be given to sequence information -see, for example, Schwartz and Maresca (2006) . Thus, for example, a primitive character will be excluded from a phylogenetic analysis while being given equal weighting in a traditional analysis. 126 See, for example, Wiley (1979); Griffiths (1976) . 127 See, for example, de Queiroz and Gauthier (1992), pp 454-57 and the references therein. 128 See, for example, Brown (2003) . Notably, comparative analysis of genomes suggests that there may even be horizontal gene transfer between Domains -see, for example, Nelson et al (1999) ; see also Lynch (2007) . 129 See, for example, Mat et al (2008); Mushegian (2008) . See also Becerra et al (2007) . 130 See, for example, Embley and Martin (2006) (2000); Woese et al (1990) . 132 See Whittaker (1969) .
133
See Cavalier-Smith (2004) . See also Balch et al (1977) . 134 See, for example, Wegener Parfrey et al (2006) . Notably, this 'super group' classification system has not gained consensus support, although some of the details about relationships remain the consensus, it is being challenged by these other schemes so that taxonomy itself cannot be said to be stable. Rather, taxonomy continues to develop, taking advantage of new technological developments and the plethora of available (genetic) information. Despite these differences and controversies about methodologies and the resulting information, the composite outcomes from these methodologies in the context of kingdom classifications may only have significant impacts for Kingdoms Animalia, Plantae and Fungi in the fine distinctions at the lower taxa of genus, species and below, as they appear to be relatively stable at the higher level taxa of kingdoms 136 and domains. 137 The broader groupings of organisms assigned to Kingdoms Protista (alternatively comprising Archezoa, Protozoa and Chromista) and Monera (alternatively comprising Eubacteria and Archaebacteria), however, appear more likely to be open to changes, given the potentially considerable diversity of organisms presently grouped in these kingdoms. 138 More significantly, the place of 'algae' remains uncertain:
139 according to the five-kingdom classification, the bluegreen algae are in Kingdom Monera, the golden algae in Protista and the red, green and brown algae in Plantae; 140 according to the six-kingdom classification (Animalia, Plantae, Fungi, Bacteria, Protozoa and Chromista) the additional Kingdom Chromista includes most of the algae (principally the golden and brown algae), although various algae are classified within Kingdoms Plantae (some of the red and green algae) and Protozoa (some of the green algae). 141 In contrast, however, the six super-group classification scheme relying heavily on phylogenetics challenges the existing kingdoms, recognising that the traditional Kingdoms Animalia, Fungi and Plantae arise within monophyletic protist lineages, so that Animalia and Fungi appear to fall within the Opisthokonta super-group, and the Plantae within the Charophyta super-group. 142 While the super-group classification has revealed are being considered and addressed -see, for example, Burki et al (2007) ; Hackett et al (2007) . See also Keeling et al (2005) ; Adl et al (2005) . 135 See, generally, Walsh and Doolittle (2005); Allers and Mevarech (2002) . 136 See, for example, Cavalier-Smith (1998) . Notably, however, some instability remains -as, for example, Cavalier-Smith's kingdom classifications proposed that Kingdom Plantae include all the Viridaeplantae (green plants based on the monophyletic symbiogenetic origin of chloroplasts) (pp 207-9). See also Cavalier-Smith (1981) . 137 See Woese (2000); Woese et al (1990) . 138 See, for example, Cavalier-Smith (2004) . Although Cavalier-Smith argues that, even among the protists, 'there may be very few, if any, previously unknown protest phylaand no "new kingdoms" -remaining to be "discovered"' (p 1260). See also, for example, Berney et al (2004) .
139
A part of the taxonomic problem with 'algae' is their contested origins -see, for example, Bhattacharya et al (2004) . 140 See, for example, Whittaker (1969) problems for the more traditional kingdom classification, the details of super-groups remain to be settled, 143 and without greater stability, consensus and its usefulness for the PBR Act and the Patents Act are uncertain. 144 Importantly, and as a generalisation, stability is not the objective of taxonomy: 'But stability is not a primary value in classification. If it were, we should rigidly retain the oldest classification irrespective of how bad it is!' 145 Whether de-linking conceptions of kingdoms from schemes of classification and the likely effect of the super-group classification on the future of kingdoms remains unclear. Perhaps an outcome will be that the super-groups resolve into more refined (and perhaps additional) kingdoms to maintain current traditions and the utility of phenotypically similar groupings such as Animalia, Fungi and Protozoa for broader scientific endeavors of classification and beyond mere phylogeny (relatedness). 146 In short, this analysis shows that taxonomy could be useful in conceiving biological organisms for the purposes of the PBR Act and the Patents Act; however, there remains instability and uncertainty about which taxonomy to apply.
Nomenclature Conceptions
Irrespective of the taxonomic choices, the naming of the organism (nomenclature) according to the naming codes might provide an alternative to determine whether an organism is suitable subject-matter. 147 Importantly, the naming codes expressly exclude directly linking naming to taxonomy, so as to separate the name of the organism from the characters of the organism.
148 Thus, for example, the International Code of Zoological Nomenclature expressly provides: Cavalier-Smith (1998), p 213. 147 While naming codes may not be a direct proxy for taxonomy, there is a measure of correspondence: Cavalier-Smith's revised six-kingdom scheme posits '[t]he two zoological kingdoms (Protozoa, Animalia) are subject to the Zoological Code of Nomenclature, the single bacterial kingdom to the Bacteriological Code of Nomenclature, and the three botanical kingdoms (Plantae, Fungi, Chromista) to the Botanical Code of Nomenclature': Cavalier-Smith (1998), p 259. The objects of the Code are to promote stability and universality in the scientific names of animals and to ensure that the name of each taxon is unique and distinct. All its provisions and recommendations are subservient to those ends and none restricts the freedom of taxonomic thought or actions.
149
Further, the naming codes have developed through practice and apply to organisms treated as the subject of zoology (International Code of Zoological Nomenclature), botany (International Code of Botanical Nomenclature and supplementary codes), bacteriology (International Code of Nomenclature of Bacteria) and virology (International Code of Virus Classification and Nomenclature and various other contested proposals). The result has been that the International Code of Zoological Nomenclature applies broadly to 'animals' referring to 'the Metazoa and also to protistan taxa when workers treat them as animals', 150 the International Code of Botanical Nomenclature applies broadly to 'organisms traditionally treated as plants … [such as] … blue-green algae (Cyanobacteria); fungi, including chytrids, oomycetes, and slime moulds; photosynthetic protists and taxonomically related non-photosynthetic groups', 151 and so on. 152 In practice, however, choosing a name requires an election to apply a particular naming code according to epistemic conventions consistent with the naming codes' subject-matters -so botanists would consider the organism something within their realm and within the naming codes applying to their subject of study.
153
Some measure of consensus and review is applied as a name only becomes formally accepted following 'publication'. 154 The effect of the naming codes is that zoological naming is applied to 'animals' and botanical naming is applied to 'plants' (including 'fungi' and 'algae'), broadly corresponding with the zoology and botany naming codes. There are some overlaps that could create some confusion (especially for 'ambiregnal organisms' -those covered by multiple codes), although again some measure of consensus and review is applied through publication and acceptance by the epistemic conventions. As a generalisation, a name is a binary combination consisting The principal ranks of taxa in descending sequence are: kingdom (regnum), division or phylum (divisio, phylum), class (classis), order (ordo), family (familia), genus (genus), and species (species). Thus, each species is assignable to a genus, each genus to a family, etc.
156
The consequence is that there is a measure of consistency between taxonomy and the choice of naming code so that 'animals' might usefully be conceived as those that are named according to the International Code of Zoological Nomenclature, and 'plants' (including 'fungi' and 'algae') conceived as those that are named according to the International Code of Botanical Nomenclature and supplementary codes.
In summary so far, taxonomy may provide a useful framework for determining whether or not a biological organism is, or is not, subject-matter for the purposes of the PBR Act and the Patents Act. The naming codes may not, however, be a suitable proxy for taxonomy given their broad practical reach and their (apparent) disconnection (except for viruses) from taxonomy. The naming codes do, however, provide a broad conception of a biological organism classification that is consistent with taxonomy in the sense that these codes pre-suppose rank-based classifications -perhaps with the exception of the contested ambiregnal organisms. So the requirement in the PBR Act that an application detail a 'name (including a synonym), in respect of a plant variety must comply with the International Code of Botanical Nomenclature and subsidiary codes' 157 is a requirement, in effect, that the subject-matter be accepted within the realm of organisms covered by the International Code of Botanical Nomenclature and subsidiary codes. Similarly, while the Patents Act imposes no such formal naming requirements, 158 even though there may be a direct proxy for deposited samples that require naming to be deposited, 159 it seems very likely most biological organisms will have acquired a name in their development. These requirements assess the particular kind of biological organism:
the process of being given a name carries with it certain consequences. This is because by the time a plant is christened with a name, the taxonomist (or in some cases a systematic biologist) will have described the plant's characteristics, assigned the plant a place within a family, explained its kinship with other plants of the same family, and shown how through some minute distinction, perhaps the veining on the leaf, the hairs on the stem, or habit of growth how the plant differs from other plants. 160 The current naming codes (International Code of Zoological Nomenclature, International Code of Botanical Nomenclature and supplementary codes, International Code of Nomenclature of Bacteria, and Code of Virus Classification and Nomenclature and various other contested proposals) are presently weighted in favour of the grouping organisms according to the 'traditional' or pre-Darwin Linnaean system of taxonomy and any anatomical and bio-molecular similarities (and specifically to genera and species).
161 Alternatives that address phylogenetics (and cover all organisms) are currently proposed with some effects for naming.
162 Despite these alternative schemes, resolving differences using taxonomy and the related names for 'plants', 'animals', 'fungi' and 'algae' at higher level taxa of kingdoms and divisions (phyla) is likely to remain useful, while such distinctions at lower level taxa might not be so useful. 163 To address these lower level taxa distinctions, other naming codes have been adopted to address the specifically different requirements of the organisms being distinguished. For example, for plants the International Code of Nomenclature for Cultivated Plants is directed to plants under cultivation, accepts the naming by the International Code of Botanical Nomenclature and merely adds extra parts of those names to differentiate lower level variations (below species taxon). 164 Thus, for example, the taxonomic name (genus species) is complemented with a cultivar or group epithet: Fragaria ananassa 'Cambridge Favourite'. 165 The increasing data from comparative and functional genomics is also likely to enhance the ability to make distinctions, but also to confuse possible distinctions by identifying horizontally transferred characters that might be attributed to other kingdoms. 166 Perhaps importantly, while the effects of phylogenetics (and the plethora of comparative and functional 160 Sherman (2008) , p 572. 161 See, for example, Cavalier-Smith (1998), pp 203 and 213-14 . This also flows through to the uses of language in the naming schemes: see de Queiroz and Gauthier (1992), pp 452-53. 162 Essentially, the clade is named independently of the taxonomic rank -see, for example, Laurin and Cantino (2007) ; Kuntner and Agnarsson (2006) . See also www.ohio.edu/phylocode/preface.html (PhyloCode). 163 See, for example, Koonin (2007) ; Wolf et al (2002) . On the likely effects of comparative and functional genomics, see Koonin (2009 In the context of the PBR Act and the Patents Act, there is the useful assignment of names according to a naming code that correspond with zoological, botanical, bacterial and viral organisms. This is essentially a choice, with those describing themselves as zoologists, botanists, bacteriologists and virologists deciding which naming code to use. The result, however, is that naming codes also provide a useful means of conceiving of biological organisms for the purposes of the PBR Act and the Patents Act, and this is generally informed by taxonomy. The significant caution must be the apparent arbitrariness of naming codes (demonstrated by the ambiregnal organisms) and their application according to epistemic conventions.
Conclusions
Final and absolute certainty about the meaning of the terms 'plants' (including 'fungi' and 'algae') and 'animals' for the purposes of the PBR Act and the Patents Act is unlikely. This article demonstrates, however, that adopting some of the conceptions from taxonomy may usefully clarify the scope of included and excluded biological organisms, and that naming codes add to this by usefully distinguish variation that might not be apparent from the taxonomic descriptions. In short, the analysis shows that taxonomy and naming codes provide a avenue of resolution to the uncertainty, though there are some further problems that emerge from seeking a final solution to definition through taxonomy and naming codes.
The analysis of the instability in taxonomy suggests that while taxonomy might usefully clarify the scope of included and excluded biological organisms defined as 'plants', 'animals', 'fungi' and 'algae', the specific content of those terms changes over time as taxonomy is inherently contested and developing. Put simply, the base unit of taxonomy is the taxon, and this is at best a hypothesis: 'names are convenient shorthand representations of scientific hypotheses, and as such should be as volatile as 167 See PhyloCode: de Queiroz (2007); Dayrat (2005) . See also Bertrand and Härlin (2006) ; Artois (2001) ; Härlin (2003) ; Bryant and Cantino (2002) . 168 See, for example, Kuntner and Agnarsson (2006 hypotheses in any other field -proposed, used, modified and then perhaps discarded as evidence dictates '. 170 To address this particular problem, IP Australia or the Parliament could mandate the particular taxonomy, updating the conceptions of 'plants', 'animals', 'fungi' and 'algae' to reflect the developing consensus. Alternatively, the assessment might be left, like many other thresholds under the PBR Act and the Patents Act, to be made at the time the application is lodged according to a 'priority date'. 171 In cases of contested and challenged PBRs and patents, this undoubtedly will include expert evidence about the appropriate taxonomy at that 'priority date', 172 and be finally determined by a judge in a federal court. 173 While not an entirely satisfying conclusion, because there remains some uncertainty about the threshold conception, the likelihood of difficult cases seems remote given that there will have been some consensus among botanists, zoologists, virologists, and so on about the lineage of the organism reflected in resolving their classifications and names within the context of their development that will be apparent at the time the application is lodged. 174 In other words, the threshold conception of biological organisms may be fuzzy, but there is likely to be consensus determinable by a judge based on expert evidence from those making and using the alleged plant variety or invention through the combined operation of taxonomy and naming. 175 In this sense, taxonomy and the naming codes do not provide a definitive standard, though they may be a useful proxy for reducing organisms to the objects of law.
A more pressing problem -and perhaps the biggest challenge to a taxonomic conception of biological organisms for intellectual property -is the advent of artificial, 176 See Sherman (2008), pp 565-66. 175 This conclusion is also consistent with the proposition that the process of naming consequently means that the organism is appropriately identified and characterised: see Sherman (2008) , p 572. These are organisms with additions and subtractions to their compositions, such as genetic materials (DNA, RNA and amino acids) or tissues, following the technical intervention of humans, with characteristics that are unique and that have surmounted the evolved barriers to reproduction. For example, the artificial insertion and deletion of DNA resulting in the presence or absence of a particular characteristic (a classic genetically modified organism), or the admixture of tissues from parental varieties resulting in a mixing of particular characteristics (such as sectorial, mericlinal and periclinal chimeras). Traditional taxonomy will be of little practical use as the artificial, reconstituted and merged biological organisms confound the traditional naming and characterising principles according to relationships and lineage. This has, however, been addressed in part by the naming codes showing that there is a viable solution. The International Code of Nomenclature for Cultivated Plants provides a practical illustration. The International Code of Nomenclature for Cultivated Plants was introduced to address the plethora of characters found in plants under cultivation that differ significantly from their wild ancestors, or that warranted distinction from wild populations for horticultural purposes, 179 and 'to promote uniformity, accuracy and fixity in the naming of agricultural, horticultural and silvicultural cultivars (varieties)'. 180 A further reason was the taxonomic complication posed specifically by plants as a consequence of outcrossing, self-crossing, apomixes, clonal propagation, polyploidy, and so on, that establish distinctive commercially useful variation not otherwise captured by the traditional taxonomic classifications and names. 181 In essence, the International Code of Nomenclature for Cultivated Plants groups plants according to shared characters or features without a definitive reference to the parents or their lineage. 182 Such organisms are often called 'cultigens' (or 'cultons') -organisms intentionally created, altered or selected by humans generally for a commercial purpose 183 -and form the 178 cultivated plant naming code for 'graft-chimeras' has supplemented the limitations of taxonomy by evolving a means of distinguishing organisms to reflect human interventions and meaningfully identify useful differences. Conceivably, other suitable naming codes might be developed and applied to any artificial, reconstituted and merged biological organisms. This solution may not be a comprehensive means to presently naming all the likely and possible artificial, reconstituted and merged biological organisms, even though these codes are evolving over time to address developing practices and trends. 195 The potential to evolve demonstrates the arbitrariness of naming codes and that they do not provide a definitive standard albeit they may be a useful proxy for reducing organisms to the objects of law.
In conclusion, the analysis here demonstrates that taxonomy and the related means of naming may be a useful way of reducing organisms to objects of law, and that this is implicated from the imprints of taxonomy and naming in the PBR Act and the Patents Act. The analysis also demonstrates that the technological development of artificial, reconstituted and merged organisms may challenge the taxonomic basis of conceiving biological organisms, and that this can be -and to some extent is being -addressed through naming codes. Significantly, though, a reliance on the naming codes for this purpose necessitates a shift away from conceiving distinctions between organisms based on a hierarchy of relationships (taxonomy). In short, this will be a challenge to our understanding of 'algae', 'animals', 'fungi' and 'plants', as they are presently conceived in the language and application of taxonomy. This will also pose a challenge to the subjectmatter of the PBR Act through the ability of naming codes to capture technological developments that defy our exiting taxonomic conceptions of 'plants' including 'algae' and 'fungi', and the ongoing relevance of express exclusion of 'animals' and 'plants' from 'innovation patents' under the Patents Act.
The main contribution of the analysis and conclusions presented here is, however, to illustrate that neither law nor science can provide a definitive resolution to reducing biological organisms to the objects of law. The PBR Act and the Patents Act appeal to taxonomy (and naming codes) as a means of definitively defining organisms as objects, and in turn, both taxonomy and naming codes fail to deliver as they too are unable to confer definitive definitions. While both law (through the PBR Act and the Patents Act) and science (through taxonomy and naming codes) appeals to certainty, this is an impossible paradox and neither can deliver. In a choice between two imperfect approaches, the result is that the law adopts a workable solution and declares the values that it essentially enshrines, albeit obfuscated in the authority of conventions practiced in other disciplines that themselves become the scaffolding of the law itself. While disappointing and anticlimactical when laid bare, it is pragmatic, and as the analysis of objectifying artificial, reconstituted and merged organisms demonstrates, it is elegantly pragmatic. 195 See, for example, , p xvii.
